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ANTITRUST, GOVERNANCE, AND 
POSTSEASON COLLEGE FOOTBALL 
Michael A. McCann* 
Abstract: This Article examines the compatibility of the Bowl Champion-
ship Series (BCS) with federal antitrust law and the appropriateness of 
the federal government using its formal and informal powers to encour-
age a new format for postseason college football. The Article begins by 
examining the legality of the BCS under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. While the BCS suffers from blatantly anticompetitive fea-
tures, its procompetitive virtues would likely prove dominant in a rule of 
reason analysis. The BCS also benefits by virtue of myriad obstacles asso-
ciated with instituting a college football playoff system. The Article then 
discusses the appropriateness of government actors concerning them-
selves with, and expending taxpayer dollars on, the scheduling of college 
football games. The Article concludes by offering possible changes to the 
scheduling structure of postseason college football, with an emphasis on 
voluntary, efficiency-promoting changes by the colleges, universities, and 
conferences currently associated with the BCS. 
Introduction 
 This Article examines the compatibility of the Bowl Championship 
Series (BCS) with federal antitrust law and the appropriateness of the 
federal government using its formal and informal powers to encourage 
a new format for postseason college football. 
 Since 1998, the BCS has served as a self-described “five-game show-
case of college football . . . designed to ensure that the two top-rated 
teams in the country meet in the national championship game, and to 
create exciting and competitive matchups among eight other highly re-
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garded teams in four other bowl games.”1 The teams that comprise this 
“showcase” are from colleges and universities in the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS), 
specifically the champions of six BCS-affiliated football conferences, and 
four other teams; the four other teams are from BCS-affiliated confer-
ences, a pool of five non-BCS-affiliated football conferences, and the 
University of Notre Dame, which is not a member of any conference.2 
Of the ten selected teams, the top two compete in the BCS National 
Championship Game, while the other eight play in one of four bowl 
games: the Fiesta Bowl, the Orange Bowl, the Rose Bowl, and the Sugar 
Bowl. Although there are over thirty other bowl games every year, the 
four BCS-sponsored bowls are undoubtedly the most popular and lucra-
tive.3 
 Particularly given both the absence of other national championship 
games (or playoffs) for Division 1 football teams and the contractual 
obligation of coaches participating in the ranking of teams (i.e., the USA 
Today Coaches Poll) to recognize the winner of the BCS national cham-
pionship game as its automatic national champion,4 the winner of the 
BCS national championship game is usually regarded by fans and media 
as “the national champion.”5 This conferral is routinely made even 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 BCS Background, BCS, http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809699 (last up-
dated Sept. 22, 2010). Although the BCS was created in 1998, bowl games between college 
football teams have been played since 1916. See M. Todd Carroll, Note, No Penalty on the 
Play: Why the Bowl Championship Series Stays In-Bounds of the Sherman Act, 61 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 1235, 1245 (2004). Since that time, the number of bowl games has increased due to 
their popularity. Id. at 1245–46. 
2 See Carroll, supra note 1, at 1253–57. The six conferences that have received automatic 
bids through the 2013 college football season are the Big East, Big Ten, ACC, Big 12, SEC, 
and PAC-10. The Business of Bowl Games: It’s All About Money, Business Pundit ( Jan. 7, 2009), 
http://www.businesspundit.com/the-business-of-bowl-games-its-all-about-money/ [hereinaf-
ter The Business of Bowl Games]. Football teams from two colleges and universities in five 
other conferences—Mountain West, Western Athletic, Conference USA, Mid-American, and 
Sun Belt—may receive bids. Id. 
3 See The Business of Bowl Games, supra note 2. The most recent iterations of these bowl 
games were titled: the Tostitos BCS National Championship Game, the Tostitos Fiesta Bowl, 
the Discover Orange Bowl, the Rose Bowl presented by Vizio, and the Allstate Sugar Bowl. 
BCS Concludes Selections with Pairings, BCS (Dec. 5, 2010), http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/ 
story?id=5889328. 
4 Dave Sittler, Bob Boycotts Coaches’ Poll, Tulsa World, Aug. 6, 2008, at B1 (“The [USA 
Today] coaches’ poll has an agreement with the BCS that the winner of the BCS title game 
is its automatic champion.”). 
5 See Stan Caldwell, Could Playoff System Work for Division 1?, Hattiesburg Am., Dec. 10, 
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 26373419; see also Press Release, Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Sen. 
for Utah, Hatch, Kohl Announce Antitrust Subcommittee Agenda for the 111th Congress 
(Mar. 25, 2009), available at http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Press 
Releases.List (follow “view by month or year” hyperlink; then search “March 2009”; then 
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though other college teams could, in theory, host their own national 
championship game or concoct their own playoff system and, if pro-
vided with the opportunity, perhaps defeat the “national champion.”6 
 In furtherance of its scheduling objectives, the BCS employs a so-
phisticated or, as some have charged, confounding,7 methodology of 
ranking teams. Each team’s BCS ranking is a composite of three equally 
weighted components—the USA Today Coaches Poll, the Harris Inter-
active College Football Poll, and an average of six computer-based 
rankings, created and operated by private sports statisticians who em-
ploy proprietary formulas.8 Proponents of this complex system insist 
that it ensures the best teams match up in the college football postsea-
son.9 Their claim enjoys historical support—at least support from the 
history as penned by the BCS: in the fifty-six years before the BCS 
formed in 1998, the teams ranked number one and number two by the 
Associated Press only played each other eight times in the postseason; 
in the twelve years since, the teams ranked number one and number 
two by the BCS have played each other every time in the postseason.10 
 BCS enthusiasts also maintain the system amplifies the value of 
regular season games: to earn a shot at a BCS-sponsored national title, a 
college football team normally has to win each and every week of the 
                                                                                                                      
follow hyperlink bearing press release name) (highlighting the BCS’s self-characterization 
of the winner of BCS Championship Game as the “National Champion”). 
6 See Jodi M. Warmbrod, Comment, Antitrust in Amateur Athletics: Fourth and Long; Why 
Non-BCS Universities Should Punt Rather Than Go for an Antitrust Challenge to the Bowl Champi-
onship Series, 57 Okla. L. Rev. 333, 373 (2004) (noting the lack of an exclusive right to a 
“national championship” for the BCS). 
7 See, e.g., C. Paul Rogers, III, The Quest for Number One in College Football: The Revised 
Bowl Championship Series, Antitrust, and the Winner Take All Syndrome, 18 Marq. Sports L. 
Rev. 285, 291 (2008); Parker Allred, Note, From the BCS to the BS: Why “Championship” Must 
Be Removed from the Bowl Championship Series, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 183, 185 (“This methodol-
ogy—arduous to understand at best . . . .”). 
8 See Mark Alesia, Calculating the BCS, Indianapolis Star, Nov. 8, 2002, at D3 (discuss-
ing the difficulty in obtaining information on the methodologies of the computer rank-
ings); Dan Hinxman, WAC Football Notebook: Vandals Within One Win of Bowl Eligibility, Reno-
Gazette J., Oct. 13, 2009 (noting the basic structure of the computation of rankings); 
Jerry P. Palm, What Do You Know About the Different Computer Rankings?, CollegeBCS.com, 
http://www.collegebcs.com/bcsfaq.html#Puter (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (discussing the 
proprietary nature of the computer rankings). 
9 See Rich Thomaselli, If You’re Wondering What Not to Do When It Comes to Social Media, 
Learn from BCS, Advertising Age, Nov. 30, 2009, at 3, 22 (discussing proponents of the 
BCS format). 
10 See Chris Dufresne, Not Everyone Is Hoping to Make Playoffs: BCS Is Making Its Case to 
Maintain Status Quo, Chi. Trib., Jan. 5, 2010, at C8. 
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regular season, be it against top opponents or weak opponents.11 In 
other words, every regular season game counts, a phenomenon that has 
been credited with increasing attendance, interest, and financial in-
vestment in those games.12 A playoff system, in contrast, could enable 
an underperforming regular season team to wait until the playoffs to 
put forth their best effort and performance.13 
 Although the ostensible purpose, if not the selection methodology, 
of the BCS is clear, the BCS itself evades traditional conceptions. To wit, 
although it is managed by an executive director, Bill Hancock, pro-
moted by public relations expert and former White House press secre-
tary Ari Fleischer, organized by the commissioners of the eleven NCAA 
FBS conferences and the director of athletics at the University of Notre 
Dame, and features an interactive website, http://www.bcsfootball.org, 
the BCS does not “exist” in a corporate or temporal sense. The BCS 
does not have a physical office and does not file corporate or legal doc-
uments in any jurisdiction.14 According to the BCS, there really is no it 
to “it.”15 Indeed, from the vantage point of this supposed non-entity, the 
BCS is merely a preferred mechanism for scheduling college football 
games.16 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Bill Hancock, A Whole Season of Playoffs on the Gridiron, Tampa Trib., Jan. 7, 2010, 
at 15. 
12 See The Bowl Championship Series: Money & Other Issues of Fairness for Publicly Financed 
Universities; Hearing Before Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Protection, Comm. on H. 
Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of John D. Swofford, Comm’r of Atlan-
tic Coast Conference) (noting the positive impact of the BCS on regular season atten-
dance). The statement itself is available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/ 
Press_111/20090501/testimony_swofford.pdf. 
13 See id. 
14 See The Bowl Championship Series: Is It Fair and in Compliance with Antitrust Law?: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Judiciary 
Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Barry J. Brett). The testimony itself is available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-07-07BrettTestimony.pdf. 
The BCS is not a corporation or other entity formalized by filing in any juris-
diction. It is not a party to the proposed ESPN television agreement . . . . The 
ESPN agreement states that the BCS is not a joint venture (i.e. “ESPN recog-
nizes that there is no Bowl Championship Series entity or BCS entity”). 
Id. 
15 See Jay C. Upchurch, Bill Hancock Takes Your Questions: The Controversial BCS Has 
Found the Ideal Spokesman, but Can This Genial Sooner Win Over Critics of the System to Put the 
Nation’s Top Two Football Teams in a Postseason Bowl?, Sooner Mag., Winter 2010, http:// 
www.oufoundation.org/sm/winter2010/story.asp?ID=361. 
16 See id. (quoting BCS spokesman Bill Hancock: “[T]he fact is the BCS is not an entity. 
It’s just a series of five games, and people try to make it out to be more than it is.”). 
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 The BCS’s innocuous-seeming self-characterization appears to be 
belied by the intense controversy it evokes. Critics of the BCS include 
U.S. President Barack Obama17 as well as myriad constituencies of in-
fluence and power. Members of Congress, most notably U.S. Senator 
Orin Hatch18 (R-UT) and U.S. Representative Neil Abercrombie19 (D-
HI), a nonpartisan political action committee, Playoff PAC,20 and le-
gions of disenchanted fans and media are fiercely opposed to the 
BCS.21 Their core criticism, generally speaking, is that the BCS selec-
tion process simply does not ensure that the “best” college football team 
competes for a national title, and that a playoff system, such as that 
used in college basketball, should be required for determination of a 
national champion.22 A related gripe is that the BCS unfairly minimizes 
opportunities for teams from non-BCS-affiliated conferences to com-
pete for a national title.23 These concerns underscore the labyrinthine 
and arguably inequitable process in which only two teams from non-
BCS-affiliated conferences are invited to compete in a BCS-affiliated 
bowl game and in which one, albeit very marketable, school—the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame—is accorded preferential treatment when com-
pared to other non-BCS-affiliated colleges and universities.24 
                                                                                                                      
 
17 See Steve Schrader, Subcommittee Passes Anti-BCS Measure, Detroit Free Press, Dec. 
10, 2009, at C4 (describing President Obama as a “BCS critic”). 
18 See Press Release, Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Sen. for Utah, Hatch Requests DOJ Investiga-
tion into BCS (Oct. 21, 2009), available at http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuse 
Action=PressReleases.List (follow “view by month or year” hyperlink; then search “Octo-
ber 2009”; then follow hyperlink bearing press release name). 
19 See Stephen Tsai, Jones Will Give His Assistants Donation, Honolulu Advertiser, Dec. 
11, 2007, at D1. 
20 See Jordan Fabian, Anti-BCS Group Launches New Ad Targeting Fiesta Bowl, The Hill ( Jan. 
4, 2010, 04:03 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/74227-playoffpac-
launches-new-ad-targeting-fiesta-bowl. The symposium that gave rise to this Article featured a 
debate between the executive director of the Playoff PAC, Matthew Sanderson, and Roy 
Kramer, founder of the BCS, video of which is available at http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/ 
newsevents/events/conferences/ncaa_symp_video.html. 
21 See generally Dan Wetzel et al., Death to the BCS: The Definitive Case Against 
the Bowl Championship Series (2010). 
22 See, e.g., Frederic J. Frommer, House Panel Passes College Football Playoff Bill: House Sub-
committee OKs Bill Aimed at Forcing College Football to Set Up New Playoff System, ABC News, 
Dec. 9, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=9292801 (discussing the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protec-
tion passing a resolution in December 2009 that would prevent the promotion of a game 
as a national title game unless it were accompanied by a playoff). 
23 See Andy Staples, Butler Nearly Toppled Goliath; Now Boise State Can Finish the Job, SI.com 
(Apr. 6, 2010), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/andy_staples/04/06/butler- 
boise/index.html#ixzz0zFSbSXMy. 
24 If it is ranked eighth or higher in the final BCS standings, the University of Notre 
Dame is guaranteed an invitation to a bowl game. See Gregory L. Curtner et al., The BCS: 
522 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:517 
 These and related objections carry economic importance. Con-
sider that in 2010, the BCS distributed nearly $143 million in revenue 
from its five bowl games, with 81% of it going to the six BCS-affiliated 
conferences, which in turn distributed the revenue to member colleges 
and universities.25 Typically, in fact, the affiliated conferences receive 
an even higher share of revenue; from 2005 to 2009, affiliated confer-
ences received $492 million, or 87% of the revenue pool, while other 
conferences, whose membership consists of nearly half of Division 1 
football schools, received just $62 million (13%).26 Unsurprisingly, the 
teams selected to participate in BCS bowl games are the BCS’s most 
fortunate beneficiaries: they each receive, on average, an $18 million 
payout.27 Keep in mind the context of these payouts. Colleges and uni-
versities frequently use them to finance their other sports teams—
which are generally unprofitable and which usually rely on the pro-
ceeds generated by the football and men’s basketball teams28—and to 
furnish student-athlete scholarships.29 
                                                                                                                     
 The benefits of participation in BCS bowl games extend far be-
yond direct financial receipts. Such participation normally generates 
considerable attention for the chosen schools and, not surprisingly, is 
often associated with increased fundraising opportunities and im-
proved quality of applicants.30 Access to the resources and exposure of 
BCS-sponsored bowls can be viewed with even greater importance in 
the midst of this recessionary era, as many colleges and universities are 
 
Antitrust Goes Bowling?, Global Competition Pol’y, May 2009, at 1, 4, available at http:// 
www.bestlawyers.com/marketing/articles/4546_36.pdf. 
25 See Michael Smith, The BCS’ Big Split, Sports Bus. J., Jan. 25, 2010, at 1. 
26 See Kristi Dosh, Is the College Football BCS Fixed?, Forbes.com (Sept. 2, 2010, 7:03 PM), 
http://blogs.forbes.com/sportsmoney/2010/09/02/is-the-college-football-bcs-fixed/ (not-
ing that the affiliated conferences, along with Notre Dame (which is not a member of a 
conference), typically receive 86% to 91% of the BCS revenue); see also Press Release, Sen. 
Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 18 (providing other data). 
27 See Thomaselli, supra note 9. 
28 See Eric Dexheimer, UT Athletics Officials Wary of Sharing Profits, Austin Am.-Statesman, 
Sept. 30, 2007, at A7. Although it varies by college and university, ninety percent of revenue 
generated by a given school’s sports program typically comes from the football and men’s 
basketball teams. See Kevin Tresolini, Many Say Wrestling Pinned by Title IX, News J. (Wilming-
ton), June 23, 2002, at 1A. Some experts posit an even higher percentage. See Loren Tate, 
Despite Economy, Guenther Has Act Together, Illinihq.com (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.illinihq. 
com/news/2010/03/04/despite_economy_guenther_has_act_together (citing remarks by 
Ron Guenther, athletic director of the University of Illinois, who estimates that ninety-eight 
percent of his university’s revenue comes from the football and men’s basketball teams). 
29 See Press Release, Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 18. 
30 See Melissa Ezarik, Admissions Score: Sports Success and College Applications, Univ. Bus., 
May 2008, at 22 (discussing the correlation between college football and basketball success 
and an increase in student applications the following year). 
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struggling financially, particularly in regards to reduced endowments 
and middling capital campaigns.31 
 Opposition to the BCS may also compel legal and legislative re-
buke, an outcome of particular interest to government actors that 
make and enforce the law and to those universities and colleges denied 
equal access to postseason bowl games. Specifically, the alleged anti-
competitiveness of the BCS has invited discussion as to whether the 
BCS violates sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, a leading source of 
federal antitrust law.32 As explained in greater detail below, section 1 
prohibits collusive activity among competitors while section 2 prohibits 
monopolistic behavior by one entity; both sections are arguably appli-
cable to the amorphous BCS and its member schools.33 The essential 
charge is as follows: the BCS and its member conferences act as a cartel 
to prevent other conferences from competing for a national title and 
other bowl games, and the riches that go along with them. 
 Unfortunately for the BCS, allegations of it behaving in a cartel-like 
and antitrust-violative manner are not merely for academic scrutiny. 
Such allegations have drawn the contemplation of law enforcement au-
thorities and legislators, who pose a legitimate threat to the BCS’s very 
existence. Most notably, the U.S. Department of Justice has signaled in-
terest in examining the legality of the BCS, though the agency has not 
commenced a formal investigation.34 
 In addition, Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff—who, like 
many Utahans, was disappointed that the undefeated University of Utah 
Utes were denied an opportunity to compete for a national title in 2009 
because they played in the Mountain West Conference, a non-BCS-
affiliated conference—has more critically associated the BCS with anti-
                                                                                                                      
31 See Eliza Krigman, Schools of Hard Knocks, Nat’l J. (D.C.), Jan. 23, 2010 (discussing 
financial challenges for colleges and universities in the recession). 
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006); see Michael P. Kenny & William H. Jordan, United States v. 
Microsoft: Into the Antitrust Regulatory Vacuum Missteps the Department of Justice, 47 Emory L.J. 
1351, 1361 (1998) (describing the Sherman Act as the “primary federal antitrust statute”). 
Other leading federal antitrust statutes include: the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–14, 19–
22, 27 (2006); the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–13(b), 21(a) (2006); and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006). See generally Nathaniel Grow, 
Antitrust & The Bowl Championship Series, 2 Harv. J. Sports & Ent. L. 53 (2011) (analyzing 
potential antitrust liability for the BCS); Janet L. McDavid, Antitrust Issues in Health Care 
Reform, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 1045, 1049 & n.30 (1994) (discussing the role of antitrust en-
forcement in health care). 
33 See infra notes 43–145 and accompanying text. 
34 See Brent Schrotenboer, Can MWC ‘Trust’ in the BCS System?: Criteria Sharpen the Fair-
ness Issue, San Diego Union-Trib., May 8, 2010, at D1; Dick Weiss, Boise Out to Crash BCS 
Again, Daily News (N.Y.), Sept. 7, 2010, at 59 (noting advocacy by law firms in Washing-
ton D.C. to encourage the Justice Department to open a formal investigation). 
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trust violations.35 Indeed, Shurtleff has repeatedly warned that his office 
is investigating the compatibility of the BCS with antitrust law, though a 
lawsuit had neither been filed nor specifically threatened.36 The ab-
sence of a filed lawsuit may be predictable; despite the many controver-
sies generated by the BCS, its legality has never been challenged in 
ur
willing-
ess
le changes to the scheduling 
structure of postseason college football.42 
                                                                                                                     
co t.37 
 Perhaps of greatest concern to the BCS are the members of Con-
gress who, by filing a bevy of bills openly hostile to the BCS, signal their 
own skepticism of the BCS’s legality. Although none of their bills—one 
of which expressly characterizes the BCS as an illegal restraint of trade 
under federal antitrust law and compels the creation of a college foot-
ball playoff system38—are poised to become law, the bills reaffirm the 
presence of BCS critics in Congress and, just as important, the 
n  of those critics to expend time and resources on the BCS.39 
 This Article begins in Part I by examining the legality of the BCS 
under federal antitrust law.40 Part II then discusses the appropriateness 
of government actors concerning themselves with, and expending tax-
payer dollars on, the scheduling of college football games.41 The Arti-
cle concludes in Part III by offering possib
 
35 See Utah Given Invitation to Join the Pac-10, Associated Press, June 17, 2010. 
36 Id. 
37 See Christopher Pruitt, Debunking a Popular Antitrust Myth: The Single Entity Rule and 
Why College Football’s Bowl Championship Series Does Not Violate the Sherman Antitrust Act, 11 
Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 125, 144 (2009). 
38 H.R. Res. 68, 111th Cong. (2009) (introduced by U.S. Rep. Neil Abercrombie on 
Jan. 15, 2009). 
39 Two bills similar to House Resolution 68 were also introduced in the House of Rep-
resentatives. The College Football Playoff Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 390, 111th Cong. (2009), 
was introduced by U.S. Representative Joe Barton on Jan. 9, 2009. If it had become law, 
House Resolution 390 would have “prohibit[ed], as an unfair and deceptive act or prac-
tice, the promotion, marketing, and advertising of any post-season NCAA Division I foot-
ball game as a national championship game unless such game [was] the culmination of a 
fair and equitable playoff system.” See H.R. Res. 390. About a week later, Championship 
Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 599, 111th Cong. (2009), was introduced by U.S. Represen-
tative Gary Miller on Jan. 16, 2009. If it had become law, House Resolution 599 would have 
“prohibit[ed] the receipt of Federal funds by any institution of higher education with a 
football team that participate[d] in the NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision, unless 
the national championship game of such subdivision [was] the culmination of a playoff 
system.” See H.R. Res. 599. 
40 See infra notes 43–145 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 146–158 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 159–170 and accompanying text. 
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I. The Legality of the BCS 
 The legal argument against the BCS primarily invokes the Sher-
man Act, which became law in 1890 and, broadly conceived, is designed 
to safeguard democratic institutions from undue consolidations of eco-
nomic power.43 As interpreted by courts, the Sherman Act’s primary 
purpose is the protection of consumers.44 There is longstanding de-
bate, however, over the appropriate meaning of “consumer protection” 
in the context of the Sherman Act.45 To some, it constitutes maximiza-
tion of economic efficiency; to others, additional goals that sound in 
distributive justice, such as the fairness of wealth concentration and 
means of wealth allocation, should also be considered.46 As detailed 
below, conceptual tensions over the Sherman Act’s underlying meaning 
impact how a court may scrutinize the BCS. 
 The Sherman Act contains seven sections, the first two of which are 
the most relevant to potential claims against the BCS. Section 1 is ar-
guably the leading source federal antitrust law, particularly in sports liti-
gation, and is the most relevant source of law for determining the legal-
ity of the BCS.47 Section 1 is regarded as governing “any coordinated 
behavior” by market actors, meaning it enjoys a broad scope over eco-
nomic activity in the United States.48 Section 1 claims are designed to 
                                                                                                                      
 
43 See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1219, 
1287–92 (1988). 
44 See e.g., Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 134 (1969); Posner v. 
Lankenau Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102, 1118 (E.D. Pa. 1986). 
45 See Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 
68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 46 (2001). 
46 See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: 
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65, 83–106 (1982) (discussing the 
dynamics of the debate over how the Sherman Act should protect consumers). Senator 
John Sherman alluded to this debate in comments before Congress: 
It is sometimes said of these combinations that they reduce prices to the con-
sumer by better methods of production, but all experience shows that this 
saving of cost goes into the pockets of the producer. The price to the con-
sumer depends upon the supply, which can be reduced at pleasure by the 
combination. . . . The aim is always for the highest price that will not check 
the demand. 
21 Cong. Rec. 2460 (1890) (statement of Sen. John Sherman). 
47 See Ross C. Paolino, Upon Further Review: How NFL Network Is Violating the Sherman Act, 
16 Sports Law. J. 1, 12 (2009). 
48 See William K. Jones, Book Note, Concerted Behavior Under the Antitrust Laws, 99 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1986, 2000 (1986) (reviewing Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of 
Antitrust Principles and Their Application (1986)). As an illustration, see, for exam-
ple, the 2005 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Gordon v. Lewis-
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prevent competitors from combining their economic power in ways that 
are considered economically harmful.49 Examples of such harm include 
increased prices, diminished quality, limited choices, and impaired 
technological progress.50 To its critics, the BCS constitutes an agreement 
among competing teams and conferences to limit competition in ways 
that unduly benefit those BCS-affiliated teams and conferences.51 
 Though less likely, a plausible claim against the BCS may also be 
brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act.52 Section 2 claims are de-
signed to prevent monopolistic behavior, and attempted monopolistic 
behavior, by a single entity.53 Section 2 claims are often considered more 
difficult to prevail upon than section 1 claims because of the require-
ment that plaintiffs prove monopoly power, the appropriate definition 
of which has confounded courts and scholars alike.54 Other significant 
limitations to section 2 include judicial tolerance of monopolists that 
behave without either a general duty to prospective customers or an ob-
ligation to compete with their competitors.55 Critics of the BCS have 
                                                                                                                      
town Hospital. 423 F.3d 184, 207 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. 
Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
49 See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports 
Law, 119 Yale L.J. 726, 735–36 (2010). 
50 See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984); 
Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238–39 (1918); Northrop Corp. v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1050 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Robert H. Bork, 
The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 50–61 (1978) (outlining eco-
nomic implications of the primary goals of antitrust laws); Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. 
Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 
Yale L.J. 1, 21–29 (1971) (discussing the relationship between the goals of antitrust law 
and professional sports). 
51 See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 18. 
52 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Section 2 stipulates that monopolization is a felony under fed-
eral law. See id. 
53 See generally Mark R. Patterson, The Market Power Requirement in Antitrust Rule of Reason 
Cases: A Rhetorical History, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 1, 10–12 (2000); see also United States v. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–72 (1966) (discussing the application of section 2 to 
prohibit monopolies); Cal. Computer Prods. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1979) (dis-
cussing application of section 2 to prohibit attempted monopolies). 
54 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Case Comment, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search 
for Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 345, 345–58; Edward Mathias, Big 
League Perestroika? The Implications of Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 203, 
206 (2000). 
55 See Thomas R. Hurst & Jeffrey M. McFarland, The Effect of Repeal of the Baseball Anti-
trust Exemption on Franchise Relocations, 8 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 263, 295 (1998) 
(discussing the relationship between section 2 and customers); John Thorne, A Categorical 
Rule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Verizon v Trinko, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 289, 292 n.16 
(2005) (noting the absence of competitive obligation for monopolists). 
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nonetheless portrayed the entity in a light consistent with that of an ille-
gal monopoly.56 
 The following Sections examine the BCS under both section 1 and 
section 2. 
A. Section 1 and the BCS 
 To some detractors of the BCS, the postseason scheduling agree-
ment between the BCS, its six sponsored conferences, and the Univer-
sity of Notre Dame is so anticompetitive that it unreasonably restrains 
interstate trade and causes harm to consumers.57 Because the BCS-
sponsored conferences and their member colleges and universities are 
competitors on the playing field and in many ways off the field, their 
agreement to collaborate on scheduling and revenue sharing, the ar-
gument goes, may constitute a violation of section 1. 
 Before assessing the legal merits of such a critique, it is important 
to canvass the purported evidence of anticompetitive behavior. Al-
though “anticompetitive” is an admittedly imprecise adjective, section 1 
of the Sherman Act is thought to regulate an expansive scope of busi-
ness practices that may be labeled anticompetitive under basic under-
standings of neoclassical economics.58 They include naked cartels of 
competitors and other coordinated arrangements between two or more 
economic actors.59 These arrangements normally pose an adverse con-
sequence to consumer prices and market output.60 
 The anticompetitive aspects of the BCS agreement are fairly trans-
parent, though not necessarily indicative of a section 1 violation. For 
starters, although the champions of the six BCS-affiliated conferences 
receive automatic bids to play in either the BCS National Champion-
ship Game or one of the four BCS-sponsored bowl games—and thereby 
                                                                                                                      
56 See generally Katherine McClelland, Comment, Should College Football’s Currency Read 
“In BCS We Trust” or Is It Just Monopoly Money?: Antitrust Implications of the Bowl Championship 
Series, 37 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 167 (2004). 
57 See, e.g., Jude D. Schmit, A Fresh Set of Downs? Why Recent Modifications to the Bowl 
Championship Series Still Draw a Flag Under the Sherman Act, 14 Sports Law. J. 219, 221 
(2007); Press Release, Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 18. 
58 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 Fla. L. 
Rev. 871, 874 (2009); see also Malcolm B. Coate, Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: An Institution-
alist View, 13 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 189, 191 (2005) (discussing anticompetitive effects in the 
context of neoclassical theory). 
59 See Hovenkamp, supra note 58, at 874. 
60 See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaborations Among 
Competitors, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1137, 1181 (2001) (illustrating the role of price and output 
effects in the application of section 1). 
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obtain the accompanying revenue and visibility from participation in 
those games—the champions from the five non-affiliated conferences 
only earn bids under highly limited, exclusionary conditions. Namely, a 
champion from a non-affiliated conference must either be ranked by 
the BCS among its top twelve teams or, if ranked higher than a cham-
pion from a BCS-affiliated conference, among the BCS’s top sixteen 
teams.61 Even then, such a non-affiliated team lacks a guaranteed ap-
pearance in a BCS bowl: if more than one such team meets the afore-
mentioned criteria, the BCS is only obligated to invite one of those 
teams to a sponsored bowl game.62 Indeed, “for all practical purposes, 
nine of the ten slots are ultimately reserved for the privileged confer-
ences due to the selection criteria utilized by the BCS.”63 
 The unbalanced distribution of BCS revenue to its six affiliated 
conferences also strikes anticompetitive tones. By agreement, each 
BCS-affiliated conference receives an equal share of BCS revenue, un-
less such a conference sends more than one team to a BCS-sponsored 
bowl game, in which case it is guaranteed a higher amount.64 Colleges 
and universities that are members of one of the six BCS-affiliated con-
ferences are guaranteed a share of the revenue allocated to their con-
ferences, meaning that even when a team underperforms, its academic 
institution financially benefits simply by virtue of the team’s member-
ship in a BCS-affiliated conference.65 With their revenue advantage, 
these colleges and universities can more readily finance substantial up-
grades to their training facilities and stadiums and obtain superior 
equipment, among other competitive benefits.66 In contrast, the five 
non-BCS-affiliated conferences and their member institutions (which 
furnish almost half of FBS teams) divide a considerably smaller share— 
typically just thirteen percent of BCS revenue—among themselves.67 
 Similarly the inability of non-BCS-affiliated conferences to affect 
structural change may be anticompetitive. Although all of the eleven 
                                                                                                                      
61 See Press Release, Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 18. 
62 See id. Such a scenario is not a mere hypothetical. In 2009, two teams from non-BCS-
affiliated conferences—the University of Utah and Boise State University—went unde-
feated and met the criteria for an invitation. See Emily Heil & Elizabeth Brotherton, No 
Holder-ing Back, Roll Call (D.C.), Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.rollcall.com/issues/54_63/- 
30665-1.html. Only the University of Utah received a BCS invitation. Id. 
63 Press Release, Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 18. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See Chad McEvoy, Predicting Fund Raising Revenues in NCAA Division I-A Intercollegiate 
Athletics, Sport J., Winter 2005, http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/predicting-fund- 
raising-revenues-ncaa-division-i-intercollegiate-athletics. 
67 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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NCAA FBS conference commissioners and the director of athletics at 
the University of Notre Dame are nominally regarded as “managers” of 
the BCS,68 the more selective BCS Presidential Oversight Committee 
(the “Oversight Committee”) is the organization’s “ultimate ruling au-
thority.”69 Consider the membership selection process for the Over-
sight Committee. The committee comprises eight representatives, seven 
of whom are selected by the six BCS-sponsored conferences and the 
University of Notre Dame, while the lone remaining vote is determined 
by the five non-BCS-sponsored conferences.70 To BCS critics, this vote 
stacking in favor of BCS-affiliated conferences “all but ensur[es]” that 
non-BCS-affiliated conferences “will have little influence on proposed 
changes or reforms.”71 
 Lastly, the mere fact of division between BCS-sponsored confer-
ences and non-BCS-sponsored conferences—the “haves” and the “have 
nots” —along with the profound difficulty that teams from non-spon-
sored conferences have gaining an invitation to play in the BCS Na-
tional Championship Game, may cause subjective, but nonetheless real 
and cyclical, harm to the “have nots.” Critics portray this division as un-
fairly stigmatizing the non-BCS-sponsored conferences and their mem-
ber institutions as inferior.72 Possible reputational costs include im-
paired recruitment of top high school football players and top coaches, 
undermined marketing strategies, and diminished alumni bases.73 In 
essence, a “self-fulfilling prophecy” emerges: because colleges and uni-
versities from non-BCS-affiliated conferences are perceived as worse, 
they become worse.74 
 Certain aspects of the purported self-fulfilling prophecy may prove 
corroborative. Consider, for instance, that two highly successful non-
BCS conference schools—Boise State University and Texas Christian 
University—have been unable to land a single Rivals.com Top 100 pro-
                                                                                                                      
68 BCS Governance, BCSFootball.org, http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id= 
4809846 (last updated Jan. 20, 2011). 
69 See Ted Lewis, Gridiron Gridlock; Once Again, the Powers That Be in College Football Will 
Explore Ways to Improve the BCS System, Hoping to Eventually Crown a Champion That Every One 
Can Live With, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Jan. 5, 2008, at 24; see also House Energy & 
Commerce Committee Hearing, supra note 12 (statement of Craig Thompson, Comm'r of 
Mountain West Conference) (describing the BCS Presidential Oversight Committee as 
“the body that runs the BCS”). 
70 See Press Release, Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 18. 
71 Id. 
72 See House Energy & Commerce Committee Hearing, supra note 12 (statement of Craig 
Thompson, Comm’r of Mountain West Conference). 
73 See id. 
74 See Press Release, Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 18. 
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spect since the Rivals rankings began in 2002.75 More generally, top 
prospects are often attracted to colleges and universities that play in 
BCS-sponsored conferences. The perception, and possible reality, that 
the BCS bowl selection system favors teams from BCS-affiliated confer-
ences probably has influenced the college choices of top recruits and 
consolidated talent in BCS-sponsored conferences.76 
 Although it is fairly easy to highlight the anticompetitive aspects of 
a scheduling system that expressly favors some conferences and their 
member institutions at the expense of others, Section C below illus-
trates how the BCS could nonetheless prevail in a Sherman Act exami-
nation of its scheduling system. 
B. The Sherman Act’s Applicability to the BCS 
 As a foundational argument, the BCS could insist that the Sher-
man Act simply does not apply to its scheduling agreements. The 
Sherman Act, after all, primarily, and some would argue exclusively, 
applies to commercial activities,77 and the BCS is—at least in its own 
view—merely a device for scheduling postseason football games among 
amateur athletes and their academic institutions.78 Moreover, courts 
have refrained from applying the Sherman Act to rules that define a 
sports activity and that lack commercial qualities.79 Consider the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s 1998 opinion in Smith v. 
NCAA,80 where the court deemed an NCAA rule that constrained eligi-
                                                                                                                      
75 See, e.g., The Rivals 100, rivals.com ( Jan. 14, 2010), http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/ 
football/recruiting/rankings/rank-2369 (ranking top high school prospects and identify-
ing what school they will attend). 
76 If true, economic consequences would follow. According to one study, top college 
football players can bring into their schools over $500,000 annually and premium athletes—
those drafted into the NFL—can bring in over $1 million annually. See Robert Brown, Esti-
mates of College Football Player Rents, 12 J. Sports Econ. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://jse.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/06/14/1527002510378333 (using economic 
extrapolation to argue that the marginal revenue product derived from having top and pre-
mium college student-athletes far outstrips the expenses incurred in complying with NCAA 
scholarship restrictions). 
77 See Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman 
Act, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 263, 348 (1986); Stephanie M. Greene, Regulating the NCAA: Making 
the Calls Under the Sherman Antitrust Act and Title IX, 52 Me. L. Rev. 81, 84 n.22 (2000) (dis-
cussing the commercial requirement in the context of the NCAA). 
78 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
79 See, e.g., Brookins v. Int’l Motor Contest Ass’n, 219 F.3d 849, 853–55 (8th Cir. 2000); 
M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 987 (1st Cir. 1984); Gunter 
Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1113–21, 1124 (D. Neb. 
1981). 
80 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds by 525 U.S. 459 (1999). 
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bility for involvement in college sports to be noncommercial and thus 
outside the scope of the Sherman Act.81 
 To be sure, BCS-sponsored bowl games invariably impact commer-
cial activity because they are worth hundreds of millions of dollars and 
lead to contracting between varied commercial actors. BCS scheduling 
policies could nonetheless be construed as fundamentally noncom-
mercial: a device for scheduling bowl games is essential to the playing 
of those bowl games. Put more conceptually, the scheduling of games is 
a necessary prerequisite to the playing of those games, at least in an 
organized league. A league, self-evidently, cannot function without a 
schedule.82 From that vantage point, BCS scheduling agreements seem 
ill-suited for Sherman Act scrutiny. 
 This putative argument seems unlikely to prevail. For one, al-
though the wording of the Sherman Act suggests a limitation of its pur-
view to commercial activity,83 the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted 
those words to prohibit a broad range of anticompetitive activities.84 
Generally, an activity that evades a commercial label can nevertheless 
find itself subject to the Sherman Act “if it is undertaken with a com-
mercial purpose or with the knowledge that it would have anticompeti-
tive effects.”85 
 The 1984 U.S. Supreme Court decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents 
of the University of Oklahoma86 only amplifies the vulnerability of BCS 
scheduling to Sherman Act scrutiny. In that case, the Court reasoned 
that when amateur sports and purportedly noncommercial sports asso-
ciations engage in a type of rulemaking that poses commercial conse-
                                                                                                                      
81 Id. at 184–85. 
82 See Marc Edelman, How to Curb Professional Sports’ Bargaining Power Vis-À-Vis the Ameri-
can City, 2 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 280, 291 (2003) (noting that scheduling is essential for 
league play). 
83 See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959) (stating 
that the Sherman Act is “aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives 
and is applied to only a very limited extent to organizations, like labor unions, which nor-
mally have other objectives”). 
84 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786–88 (1975) (stating that the so-
licitation and servicing of legal representation qualifies as commercial activity); see also 
Thomas Scully, Note, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma: The 
NCAA’s Television Plan is Sacked by the Sherman Act, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 857, 857–58 (1985) 
(discussing expansion of the Supreme Court’s view of commercial activity). 
85 See Tara Norgard, Note, How Charitable Is the Sherman Act?, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1515, 
1523–24 (1999). But see John Vanderstar, Liability of Municipalities Under the Antitrust Laws: 
Litigation Strategies, 32 Cath. U. L. Rev. 395, 397–98 (“The Court has been reluctant to apply 
the antitrust laws to the conduct of those who are not engaged in commercial activities.”). 
86 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
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quences, resulting rules may be subject to Sherman Act scrutiny.87 Sub-
sequent case law indicates that scheduling of college athletics games is 
one such form of rulemaking. Namely, in Worldwide Basketball & Sport 
Tours, Inc. v. NCAA,88 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 
2004 examined an NCAA rule that limited the scheduling of college 
basketball games to a certain group of teams. Perhaps discouragingly 
for the BCS, the Sixth Circuit found that the rule had exhibited suffi-
cient “commercial impact insofar as it regulate[d] games that con-
stitue[d] sources of revenue for both the member schools and the Pro-
moters.”89 BCS policies on scheduling appear to embody similar 
qualities, particularly as they relate to the sourcing and uneven distribu-
tion of revenue among member and non-member institutions. 
C. Rule of Reason Analysis for the BCS 
 On balance, the Sherman Act appears to regulate BCS scheduling 
agreements. The BCS, however, could still establish that those agree-
ments satisfy the Act’s scrutiny under section 1. A section 1 claim against 
the BCS would trigger one of two standards of review: per se analysis or 
rule of reason analysis. A trial judge hearing such a claim would be obli-
gated to select a standard of review.90 
 The selection of per se analysis, which presumes that a challenged 
agreement violates section 1, and which imposes liability irrespective of 
procompetitive effects or motive,91 is unlikely. For one, per se analysis 
has attracted disfavor by courts in recent years.92 Its rigidity and inflexi-
bility, in particular, have drawn critique.93 In addition, per se analysis is 
normally reserved for certain types of agreements—most notably price-
                                                                                                                      
87 Id. at 111–12. 
88 388 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2004). 
89 Id. at 959. 
90 See Lawrence A. Sullivan, The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 
Calif. L. Rev. 835, 891 (1987) (noting the importance and implications of a judge’s deci-
sion in determining the standard of review in antitrust cases). 
91 See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982); see also State Oil 
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (noting that per se analysis is used to determine if a 
restraint shows a “predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect”). 
92 See Thomas Chen, Note, Authorized Generics: A Prescription for Hatch-Waxman Reform, 
93 Va. L. Rev. 459, 489 (2007). This disfavor relates to a general trend in antitrust scrutiny 
toward reasonableness analysis and away from per se findings. See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shift-
ing and Predictability of Law, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 427, 458 (1995); Glen O. Robinson, Ex-
plaining Vertical Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust Method, 80 Va. L. Rev. 577, 605 
(1994) (discussing the history of the application of rule of reason and per se analyses). 
93 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago Schools: A New Antitrust 
Approach for the 21st Century, 82 Ind. L.J. 345, 355 (2007). 
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fixing schemes94 and group boycotts95—that are distinct from the sorts 
of scheduling agreements entered into by the BCS.96 
 A court is far more likely to utilize rule of reason analysis when 
scrutinizing BCS scheduling agreements under section 1. Rule of rea-
son analysis, which, unlike per se analysis, tends to advantage defen-
dants,97 constitutes an inquiry grounded in fact, empirical data, and 
objective context.98 Under rule of reason review, an agreement is only 
prohibited if it produces an anticompetitive injury that outweighs pro-
competitive effects.99 
 Courts normally apply rule of reason analysis to joint ventures,100 
which refer to associations of “two or more persons designed to carry 
out a single business enterprise for profit for which purpose they com-
bine their property, money, effects, skill, and knowledge.”101 Courts 
have described a diverse set of associations as joint ventures, with the 
label affixed to professional sports leagues and their franchises, credit 
card networks, and stock exchanges.102 These and other types of joint 
ventures may enhance efficiency and generate goods that, in the ab-
sence of the joint venture, would prove less economical or outright un-
profitable.103 
                                                                                                                      
94 See, e.g., In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that a price-fixing agreement is a per se violation of section 1). 
95 See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284, 290–91 (1985) (stating that a group boycott is a per se violation of section 1). 
96 Fee schedule agreements, however, have been subject to per se analysis. See, e.g., 
Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 355–57 (using per se analysis to scrutinize a preferred 
provider organization’s fee-scheduling agreement). 
97 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 
61 Tul. L. Rev. 777, 825–29 (1987) (discussing how per se analysis advantages plaintiffs); 
Recent Case, Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996), 110 Harv. L. Rev. 523, 527 
(1996) (“[R]ule of reason analysis heavily favors defendants.”). 
98 See Five Smiths, Inc. v. NFL, 788 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (D. Minn. 1992). 
99 See Gordon H. Copland & Pamela E. Hepp, Government Antitrust Enforcement in the 
Health Care Markets: The Regulators Need an Update, 99 W. Va. L. Rev. 101, 107–08 (1996). 
100 See Michael A. McCann, Justice Sonia Sotomayor and the Relationship Between Leagues 
and Players: Insights and Implications, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 901, 919–20 (2010); see, e.g., Major 
League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 338 (2d Cir. 2008). 
101 See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2185, 
2252 (2007). 
102 See Piraino, supra note 60, at 1173–74. 
103 See Derek Devgun, Crossborder Joint Ventures: A Survey of International Antitrust Consid-
erations, 21 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 681, 690–91 (1996); F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, 
Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private Ordering Solution to the Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. 
Rev. 111, 135 (2007) (noting the success of joint ventures under the rule of reason). 
534 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:517 
 As an association, the BCS seems most aptly described as a joint ven-
ture.104 The BCS consists of representatives from conferences and other 
academic entities who determine rules for the ranking of FBS teams and 
the production of a national championship game and four bowl games. 
The BCS may not be essential to the production of these goods—after 
all, the conferences and their members could develop a different system 
for production of a national championship game or bowl games105—but 
it has been found to promote production efficiencies.106 
 Analyzing the BCS and its contracts as a joint venture subject to 
rule of reason analysis would require determining the relevant mar-
ket.107 Identification of the relevant market for the BCS and its pur-
portedly anticompetitive contracts may pose a challenging task. In 
many cases, identification of a relevant market is “inextricably related 
to the question of whether the defendant’s competitors have been or 
will be foreclosed from the market by virtue of the challenged acts.”108 
To facilitate identifying the relevant market, a court would likely define 
the BCS market in two components: the product market and the geo-
graphic market.109 
 The product market for BCS-sponsored football would capture its 
unique identities and whether there are “reasonably interchangeable” 
                                                                                                                      
104 A characterization of the BCS as a joint venture has been reached in other legal 
scholarship. See, e.g., Warmbrod, supra note 6, at 356. Single entity status, however, has also 
been ascribed to the BCS. See, e.g., Pruitt, supra note 37, at 128. 
105 See, e.g., Bernie Lincicome, The BCS Is All About Politicking. Urban Meyer Gets That and 
Now Florida, Not Michigan, Is Playing in the Title, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Dec. 7, 2006, 
at C2 (“[T]he BCS is entirely unnecessary . . . . No. 1 and No. 2 can be determined by vote, 
and unless there are only two undefeated teams to rank, as they were last year with Texas 
and USC, disagreements are as inevitable then as now.”). 
106 See Warmbrod, supra note 6, at 356 (“Without the agreement among the confer-
ences, a national championship game would probably not occur because of the historically 
and contractually established conference relationships with various bowls.”). 
107 It is possible, though unlikely, that a court could adopt a “quick look” rule of rea-
son analysis that would not compel determination of a relevant market. See Cal. Dental 
Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–71 (1999). Instead, competitive harm is presumed and the 
defendant has the burden of justifying the restraint on trade. See id. Quick look analysis is 
used in cases where extensive empirical analysis under regular rule of reason is not re-
quired and where per se analysis is ill suited due to the lack of obvious anticompetitive 
effects. See id. Analysis of the BCS, however, would likely compel substantial empirical anal-
ysis and determination of the relevant market. For a cogent discussion of the forms of 
analysis used in sports-related antitrust cases, see Michael A. Cokely, In the Fast Lane to Big 
Bucks: The Growth of NASCAR, 8 Sports Law. J. 67, 91 (2001). 
108 1 Louis Altman & Malla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trade-
marks and Monopolies § 4:31 (4th ed. 2009). 
109 See Daniel E. Lazaroff, Entry Barriers and Contemporary Antitrust Litigation, 7 U.C. Da-
vis Bus. L. J. 1, 28 (2006) (noting the usual importance of product and geographic mar-
kets in rule of reason analysis). 
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substitutes.110 In antitrust litigation concerning the broadcasting of 
NCAA-sponsored football games, the relevant market has been identi-
fied quite narrowly as the broadcasting of NCAA-sponsored college 
football games, as opposed to the broadcasting of any college football 
games, any football games, any sporting events, or any other type of 
entertainment.111 The idiosyncratic characteristics of such program-
ming are thought to attract a distinctive class of audience, and one that 
commands a compact, non-commutable product market.112 Antitrust 
litigation relating to the playing of NFL games has yielded similarly 
constricted interpretations of the appropriate product market.113 It is 
therefore plausible, if not likely, that an appropriate product market for 
BCS-sponsored football would be construed restrictedly. Such a market 
could constitute the deliverance, playing, and marketing of elite, post-
season college football games. 
 The geographic market for the BCS is more predictable. Normally, 
a geographic market refers to the locations where consumers seek a par-
ticular product.114 For BCS-sponsored football, the market seems unde-
niably a national one. The BCS sponsors a “national” championship 
game that is broadcast across the United States (indeed, the world) and 
that attracts the interest of consumers from all parts of the country.115 
 With a relevant market established for the BCS, rule of reason 
analysis would likely then require a determination of market power, an 
often costly and uncertain task for plaintiffs.116 Conceptually, market 
power for a joint venture refers to the venture’s ability to raise prices 
“above the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly that 
                                                                                                                      
110 See United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393–95 (1956). 
111 See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 95, 116–20. 
112 Id. 
113 See, e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1393 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(reasoning that the type of audience attracted to watching NFL football games is unique 
and thus that there are “limited substitutes” for consumers of NFL games); see also Ethan 
Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 Duke L.J. 339, 403–04 (ad-
vocating that the unique qualities of NFL football games lends themselves to an absence of 
substitute products). 
114 See Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 576 (discussing the presence of a national geographic 
market); see also Ilene Knable Gotts & Daniel E. Hemli, Just the Facts: The Role of Customer 
and Economic Evidence in M&A Analysis, 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1217, 1219 (2006) (furnish-
ing insight on the configuration of geographic markets). 
115 The BCS National Championship Game is now even broadcast nationally in 3-D. See 
Walt Belcher, John Tesh Shares Tips, Music with ‘Daytime,’ Tampa Trib., Dec. 8, 2008, at 2 
(noting that Fox Sports broadcasts the game nationally in 3-D). 
116 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Anti-
trust Analysis, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 685, 689–91 (1991). 
536 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:517 
the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded.”117 As a prac-
tical matter, a joint venture with market power dominates a market in 
such a way that prices can be maintained at artificially high levels.118 
George Hay, one of the foremost antitrust authorities in the United 
States, characterizes potential consumer harm as a foundational con-
cern of market power assessment: “If the structure of the market is such 
that there is little potential for consumers to be harmed, we need not 
be especially concerned with how firms behave because the presence of 
effective competition will provide a powerful antidote to any effort to 
exploit consumers.”119 
 When examining the market power of a joint venture, courts nor-
mally scrutinize the extent to which the venture robs the marketplace 
of competition that would occur in its absence.120 More positively, 
courts also highlight whether a joint venture improves market efficien-
cies or delivers enhanced goods to consumers.121 Joint ventures usually 
satisfy rule of reason analysis.122 Courts often find they promote market 
efficiencies and provide consumers with a superior marketplace.123 At 
the same time, courts are wary of joint ventures that restrain the mar-
ketplace “broader than necessary.”124 
 The BCS as a joint venture, when judged in a narrowly defined, 
national market, can offer a variety of arguments that are both consis-
tent with efficiency-promoting and unreflective of consumer harm. 
 For one, the BCS provides consumers with a national champion-
ship game and four prominent bowl games that may otherwise prove 
unavailable. After all, until the BCS came into existence, there was “no 
procedure for attempting to match the top two ranked teams against 
                                                                                                                      
117 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. 
L. Rev. 937, 937 (1981). Proof of market power is not always required in rule of reason 
analysis, but often is. See Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 
Harv. L. Rev. 1299, 1309–10 (1992). 
118 See, e.g., Peter J. Howe, Role of Power Firms in N.E. Scrutinized, Bos. Globe, May 12, 
2001, at A1 (discussing market power in the context of the energy industry). 
119 George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 Antitrust L.J. 807, 808 (1992). 
120 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686–92 (1978) (describ-
ing the evolution of the rule of reason and explaining the rule’s focus on the competitive 
significance of a restraint). See generally Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule 
of Reason, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 77 (applying the rule of reason to price variations among 
industries). 
121 See, e.g., Kieff & Paredes, supra note 103, at 135. 
122 See id. 
123 See Thomas (Tim) Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational Fragmentation in 
Health Care, 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 217, 225 (2009). 
124 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Analysis of Network Joint Ventures, 47 Hast-
ings L.J. 5, 32 (1995). 
2011] Antitrust, Governance, and Postseason College Football 537 
each other.”125 History suggests that without the BCS, organizers of col-
lege football would be ill equipped to schedule postseason matchups 
between the two best teams: in the fifty-six years prior to the BCS, the 
number one and number two ranked teams only played each other 
eight times, or, on average, once every seven years.126 
 Along those lines, although a sixteen-team playoff system, as advo-
cated by many, would provide a different type of excitement for college 
football fans and greater opportunities for non-BCS-sponsored confer-
ences to attract the limelight, it would not ensure that the top two FBS 
teams played each other.127 Such a playoff system might also lengthen 
the playing season for student-athletes or, to avoid that outcome, elimi-
nate regular season games that, for some colleges and universities, are 
of tremendous economic value.128 In that same vein, remember that 
the BCS raises the value of regular season games.129 Empirical data is 
corroborative: “For the 15 years before the BCS, attendance at all regu-
lar season college football games remained flat. . . . Since the formation 
of the BCS, that number has grown each year” because “the regular 
season games matter so much.”130 
 In furtherance of appealing to the maximum number of college 
football fans, the BCS also financially rewards those conferences that 
generate the most fan interest—and revenue production—while treat-
ing as inferior the smaller and less financially contributing conferences. 
Although a bottom-up perspective might direct the BCS to assist the lat-
ter type of conferences, creating a legal obligation for such an outcome 
seems unfounded and potentially self-destructive.131 After all, if the six 
BCS-sponsored conferences were no longer provided with automatic 
bids, membership in the BCS would seemingly lose much of its appeal. 
                                                                                                                      
125 See Pruitt, supra note 37, at 140. 
126 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
127 See Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 14 (testimony of Barry J. Brett) (de-
scribing the advantages of a sixteen-team playoff system). The statement itself is available 
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-07-07BrettTestimony.pdf. 
128 For a compelling case against college football playoffs, see Playoff Problem, http:// 
www.playoffproblem.com/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). But see Senate Judiciary Committee Hear-
ing, supra note 14 (testimony of Barry J. Brett) (claiming that disadvantages to a playoff for-
mat are exaggerated by BCS supporters). 
129 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
130 House Energy & Commerce Committee Hearing, supra note 12 (statement of John D. Swof-
ford, Comm’r of Atlantic Coast Conference). The statement itself is available at http://dem- 
ocrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090501/testimony_swofford.pdf. 
131 See Celia R. Taylor, Microcredit as Model: A Critique of State/NGO Relations, 29 Syra-
cuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 303, 315 (2002) (describing basic concepts of a bottom-up ap-
proach to law and policy). 
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 The BCS can also attempt to repel adverse findings in a rule of rea-
son analysis by highlighting its use of empirically driven rankings. As 
discussed earlier, the BCS furnishes a sophisticated ranking methodol-
ogy that blends together—albeit in a somewhat mysterious manner— 
empirical data, statistical insights, and traditional human impressions.132 
Although two-thirds of this methodology are contingent upon human 
impressions, which have sometimes elicited rebuke,133 it has nonetheless 
drawn praise for its incorporation of objective measurements.134 The 
use of objective criterion to rank—and reward—teams would likely 
benefit the BCS in antitrust scrutiny, as such scrutiny tends to favor em-
pirically driven approaches.135 
                                                                                                                     
 Finally, the BCS could assert an absence of discernable consumer 
injury caused by BCS scheduling. For starters, the BCS may not raise 
consumer prices for goods related to postseason college football, or at 
least not in a disconcerting way. For instance, although ticket prices to 
attend the BCS National Championship Game and BCS-sponsored 
bowl games are surely exorbitant for most consumers—especially when 
two popular college football teams are scheduled to play one another 
in a bowl game—those prices appear to reflect consumer demand for 
the product and the finite supply of stadium seats to watch the game 
live.136 Then again, for many schools, ticket prices for regular season 
games against opponents from BCS-sponsored conferences are higher 
than for those against non-BCS-opponents. Perhaps that reveals BCS 
conference sponsorships as raising prices for consumers. That finding, 
however, presents a “chicken-and-egg” problem: are the ticket prices 
higher because teams in BCS-sponsored conferences are themselves 
 
132 See Martin Manley, 5 Things Right with the BCS, upon further review ( Jan. 9, 2009, 
5:57 PM), http://uponfurtherreview.kansascity.com/?q=node/380; see also supra note 8 
and accompanying text (noting aspects of BCS ranking that are not publicly revealed). 
133 See Rob Oller, After 75 Years, Polls Still Stir Up Football Fans, Columbus Dispatch, 
Aug. 20, 2010, at 1C. 
134 See, e.g., Kevin Modesti, BCS Poll Is as Good as Any in the Nation, L.A. Daily News, 
Dec. 11, 2001, at S1. 
135 See Christopher S. Kelly, Note, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.: 
The Final Blow to the Use of Per Se Rules in Judging Vertical Restraints—Why the Court Got It 
Wrong, 28 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 593, 621–22, 634, 646 (2008); see also Joshua D. Wright, Over-
shot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the Chicago School’s Influence on Antitrust, 5 Competi-
tion Pol’y Int’l J. 189, 199–205 (2009) (discussing the role of empirical studies in influ-
encing antitrust policy). 
136 See TicketCity Reveals the Top 10 Hottest College Bowl Games and Presents the 2009 Bowl 
Challenge: Bowl Prices Fluctuate as Fans Gamble Which Game Will Feature Their Favorite Team, 
Bus. Wire, Nov. 30, 2009 (quoting Randy Cohen, CEO of TicketCity: “With the SEC 
Championship determining who will play in the BCS Championship, the average price for 
the BCS will increase depending on which team makes it.”). 
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more marketable, or because membership in a BCS-sponsored confer-
ence makes them more marketable?137 
 Consumer harm may also not be provable through an output-
oriented argument. To be sure, the BCS may reduce an ideal output of 
games for consumers to enjoy, since a sixteen-team playoff would in-
volve more teams and thus more games. On the other hand, the BCS 
did not replace a playoff system—in fact, in the more than five decades 
of organized college football that preceded the BCS, there was no play-
off system. A future possibility of such a playoff system also carries a va-
riety of real-world obstacles, including concern that it would harm the 
overall product of postseason college football.138 From those vantage 
points, the BCS seemingly does not “reduce” a previous or certain out-
put of games that would otherwise exist in its absence. Perhaps the op-
posite, in fact: the BCS might increase the output of postseason games 
or at least elevate their quality. 
 The BCS and a college football playoff system, moreover, would 
not comprise mutually exclusive entities; both could exist simultane-
ously and compete against one another. Of course, the dominance of 
the BCS in controlling the production of playoff college football games 
may, as a practical matter, preclude competition.139 That would seem 
especially true in light of the aforementioned inequities among institu-
tions in BCS-sponsored conferences and those in non-BCS-sponsored 
conferences—inequities caused by, or at least consequences of, the 
BCS.140 In light of the popularity of the BCS National Championship 
Game and the four BCS-sponsored bowl games, along with the BCS-
enhanced value of regular season games, however, the unique qualities 
                                                                                                                      
137 See, e.g., Brett Dawson, UK Raises Prices of Football Tickets, Courier-J. (Louisville), 
Apr. 13, 2010, at C3 (noting higher ticket prices for University of Kentucky football games 
against opponents from BCS-sponsored conferences). Chicken-and-egg problems are ap-
parent across industries. See, e.g., Judith A. McMorrow, Professional Responsibility in an Uncer-
tain Profession: Legal Ethics in China, 43 Akron L. Rev. 1081, 1082–83 (2010) (describing 
chicken-and-egg problems in legal academia). 
138 See Steve Yanda, BCS Is Decried During Hearings: Subcommittee Warns of Potential Action, 
Wash. Post, May 3, 2009, at D01 (describing how implementation of a playoff system might 
endanger the system and success of bowl games). 
139 If non-BCS schools attempted to form a rival ranking system/tournament and 
failed because the barrier to entry proved insurmountable, it would strengthen an anti-
trust attack of the BCS, especially in terms of establishing BCS’s market power. Cf. Nelson 
v. Monroe Reg’l Med. Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555, 1573 (7th Cir. 1991) (“It is fundamental that in 
order to establish market power, the plaintiffs must show a barrier to entry that prevents 
competition.”). 
140 See supra notes 22–31 and accompanying text. 
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of the BCS appear to have procompetitive qualities that may outweigh 
their anticompetitive effects. 
D. Section 2 and the BCS 
 Although criticisms of the BCS most commonly raise section 1 
concerns, section 2 supplies an additional source of examination. Sec-
tion 2 bars an entity from intentionally behaving as an illegal monopoly 
in a relevant market.141 Various politicians and commentators have 
characterized the BCS as an illegal monopoly.142 Senator Hatch, for 
instance, contends that the BCS enjoys monopoly power because it has 
purportedly eliminated actual and potential competition for elite post-
season college football.143 
 For purposes of section 2, the relevant market of the BCS would 
likely constitute either the national championship game or the four 
BCS-sponsored bowl games.144 A court assessing the BCS in those mar-
kets would necessarily weigh the possible, albeit meager and highly re-
stricted, opportunities for teams from non-BCS-sponsored conferences 
to participate in either the national championship game or in one of 
the four BCS-sponsored bowl games. 
 The BCS may appear monopolistic if one highlights its system of 
automatic bids. Indeed, because of the six automatic bids for the six 
BCS-sponsored conferences, at least two of the BCS-sponsored bowl 
games are played only by teams from BCS-sponsored conferences. Then 
again, the BCS does not “own” the concept of a national championship 
game between FBS teams; other FBS teams could, in theory, host one. 
The same is true of bowl games. Dozens of non-BCS-sponsored bowl 
games are played each year, albeit typically with less fanfare and smaller 
economic benefit. 
 Perhaps further strengthening a BCS defense to a section 2 claim is 
the requirement that monopolistic power arise through non-
meritorious means. In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated such a 
point in United States v. Grinnell Corp.: an illegal monopoly under section 
2 must reflect a “willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as dis-
                                                                                                                      
141 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71 (showing the importance 
of intentional behavior with Section 2 claims). 
142 See Mark Wiedmer, Obama Not Too Busy to Push His BCS Concerns, Chattanooga Times 
Free Press, Jan. 18, 2009, http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2009/jan/18/obama- not- 
too-busy-push-his-bcs-concerns/ (noting various politicians that have proposed legislation in 
response to the BCS). 
143 See Press Release, Sen. Orrin Hatch, supra note 18. 
144 See Rogers, supra note 7, at 299. 
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tinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen or historic accident.”145 Although BCS critics 
may establish the practical inability of entities to rival the BCS, the BCS 
can respond, with some persuasion, by characterizing its dominance as 
merely reflective of a superior product and an optimal venue for con-
sumer interests. 
II. The Appropriateness of the Government  
Investigating the BCS 
 A reader of this Article might rightfully wonder: Why does the 
government care about this topic? To be sure, the list of serious prob-
lems facing the United States is long and frightening, and although the 
author does not profess to have the list, surely the plight of postseason 
college football is not listed anywhere near the top.146 It may thus seem 
dubious for federal and state governmental bodies to expend tax dol-
lars, time, and other assets investigating the “fairness” and possible ille-
gality of college football scheduling. Resources are, after all, finite and 
opportunity costs arise when the government investigates the BCS at 
the expense of other topics. 
 So why is the BCS—and, for that matter, other “crisis”-causing 
sports entities—in the cross-hairs of Congress and the Justice Depart-
ment? Undoubtedly, government, and particularly elected officials, are 
partly motivated by the media attention generated by such investiga-
tions.147 Granted, some of the attention can prove quite negative. For 
instance, after the chairman and ranking member of the House Gov-
ernment Reform Committee issued subpoenas to investigate steroid 
                                                                                                                      
145 384 U.S. at 570–71. 
146 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Phantom Menace, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 2009, at 
A27 (outlining the economic troubles confronting many U.S. citizens). 
147 Even members of Congress agree that desire to attract headlines influences Con-
gress’s interest in sports investigations. See, e.g., Source: Mitchell Investigation Now Has Key Docu-
mentation, Capital, Nov. 16, 2007, at C3 (citing comments by U.S. Senator John McCain, who 
characterized a possible congressional hearing on steroids in baseball as being for “a little 
headline grabbing”). What might be deemed congressional dog-and-pony shows are not 
limited to sports investigations. Consider that during the financial crisis, critics accused some 
government actors of issuing an inordinate amount of subpoenas to investigate hedge funds 
to solicit media attention. See Craig S. Warkol & Robert E. Hauberg Jr., Aspatore Spe-
cial Report: Assisting Clients in Government Investigations During a Financial 
Crisis; An Immediate Look at the Attorney’s Role in Resolving the Key Legal Issues 
Surrounding Government Investigations (2008) (noting sensational news stories during 
the “financial crisis” motivated government actors to conduct “overbroad” investigations). 
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use in baseball in 2005, they were derided as ego-obsessed.148 Still, 
those same congressmen appeared on newscasts all over the country. 
                                                                                                                     
 The notion that political actors gravitate toward media-friendly 
investigations, such as those concerning sports, is verifiable through 
more than common sense. It is also consistent with basic theories of 
human behavior. Communication theory scholars, for instance, find 
that because many political actors presume that news media influences 
public perceptions, they are motivated to be in the news.149 
 Simple enough, perhaps, but politicians’ enthusiasm to be in the 
news for sports investigations still draws the ire of many. This strain of 
criticism is neither new nor unique to college football. Over the last 
decade, Congress has attracted scorn for actively investigating steroid 
use in professional baseball, with particular rebuke reserved for high-
profile congressional hearings that feature Major League Baseball 
stars.150 Critics have lampooned these investigations as ridiculous and 
have derisively parodied the associated hearings.151 Some have gone a 
step further, contending that policies affecting professional athletes 
ought to be left to the collectively bargained discretion of leagues and 
their respective players’ associations and far from the halls of Con-
gress.152 An analogous deduction might be raised of postseason college 
football: let the conferences and their member colleges and universities 
determine their own system of games. At worst, some colleges and uni-
versities will be economically disadvantaged and some of their fans and 
 
148 See Spencer S. Hsu & Michael D. Shear, The Fan with Subpoena Power: Hearings on 
Steroid Use in Baseball Put Political Spotlight on Davis, Wash. Post, March 11, 2005, at B01. 
149 See Jonathan Cohen et al., The Influence of Presumed Media Influence in Politics: Do Poli-
ticians’ Perceptions of Media Power Matter?, 72 Pub. Opinion Q. 331, 331–43 (2008) (noting 
the political actor that perceives a greater degree of media influence on the public is more 
likely to solicit the media to generate coverage and promote his or her agenda). 
150 See Michael McCann, Fehr and Selig in D.C.: What Will Happen When Bud and Don Face 
Congress?, Sports Illustrated, Jan. 15, 2008, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/ 
writers/michael_mccann/01/14/mccann.congress/index.html (predicting the outcome 
of testimony by Donald Fehr and Bud Selig before Congress about steroid use in baseball). 
151 See, e.g., Mark McGuire, Hold the Work, Time for a Hearing, Times Union (Albany), 
June 13, 2008, at B2; Will Leitch, Impotent ‘Roid Rage’: Why Rocket Hearings Didn’t Take Off, 
N.Y. Mag., Feb. 25, 2008, at 32; Howard Mortman, Congress: The Ball’s in Their Court, Poli-
tico (Sept. 3, 2007), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0907/5613.html. 
152 See, e.g., Brent D. Showalter, Comment, Steroid Testing Policies in Professional Sports: 
Regulated by Congress or the Responsibility of the Leagues?, 17 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 651, 677–78 
(2007) (discussing professional sports leagues’ drug testing policies and proposing that 
Congress should not mandate drug testing policies for all leagues); Journal Editorial Report: 
Panel Discusses News of the Week (Fox News Network television broadcast Feb. 17, 2008) 
(quoting Steve Moore of the Wall Street Journal: “I don’t think this is something Congress 
should get involved in, in the first place.”). 
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student-athletes will be disappointed, but no one’s life will be lost, no 
one’s health will be hurt, and no one will lose his or her home or well-
being. 
 The charge that the BCS and the scheduling of postseason college 
football teams are not worthy of government investigation may none-
theless be misplaced. It might also signal a form of prejudice against an 
otherwise legitimate topic merely because that topic is sports related. 
 Keep in mind, college football is a major commercial enterprise 
which generates significant viewership and substantial business activity. 
The collective revenues gathered from bowl games in 2009–2010 alone 
topped $237 million and provided profits of over $157 million for par-
ticipating schools.153 Not only are these totals impressive, they are grow-
ing.154 
 These revenues only form the tip of the iceberg. As noted earlier, 
universities with successful college football programs enjoy an increased 
profile among prospective students and recruits.155 Similarly, countless 
businesses and alumni are closely affiliated, in an economic sense, with 
college programs.156 Empirical evidence has shown that alumni and 
boosters respond positively to football bowl participation in the form of 
financial contributions.157 Consequently, any unfairness in the ability to 
participate in BCS bowl games poses an impact not only on immediate 
bowl revenue streams but also on the retention and attraction of other 
major college sponsorship and donor opportunities.158 
 Organizational decisions of the BCS have profound effects on the 
economic prospects of individual schools and on the competitive land-
scape of college football as a whole. Why, then, does the prospect of 
congressional oversight arouse such skepticism? Does congressional 
oversight of other media-friendly industries such as the entertainment 
industry and the video game industry not strike commentators as simi-
larly frivolous? 
                                                                                                                      
153 See Bowl Excess Revenue Expenses by Conference 2009–10, NCAA (Feb. 2, 2010), http:// 
www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/pdfs/postseason+football/bowl+excess+ 
revenue+expenses+by+conference+2009+10. 
154 For instance, revenue grew 4% and profitability increased by an impressive 6% 
from 2008–2009 to 2009–2010. Id. Taking a slightly longer view, the NCAA’s own literature 
reveals that revenues have grown approximately 31% and that profits have grown ap-
proximately 29% since 2002–2003. Id. 
155 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
156 See Thomas A. Rhoads & Shelby Gerking, Educational Contributions, Academic Quality 
and Athletic Success, 18 Contemp. Econ. Pol’y 248, 248–57 (2000). 
157 See id. 
158 See id. 
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 Perhaps criticism ought to be levied against the political actors who 
are interested in the BCS not so much for the merits of their pursuit, 
but rather for their inability to persuade Americans of their legitimate 
investigatory rationales. By framing their dissatisfaction of the BCS as a 
question of sporting fairness rather than as a potentially illegal form of 
economic manipulation, political actors have likely undersold the topic. 
III. Alternative Approaches 
 The prospect of an antitrust case against the BCS should not tempt 
BCS critics to count down the days to a college football playoff system— 
at least not a system compelled by a court order. As analyzed in this Arti-
cle, such a case presents, at best, a mixed bag, and one that on balance 
seems tilted in favor of the putative defendant. 
 Improving the competitiveness of postseason college football, 
however, may still be accomplished through changes to the BCS. 
 One possible reform would be dramatic: using economic ration-
ales—as opposed to legal compulsion—to persuade BCS members to 
dismantle the BCS and to adopt a playoff system. Such a system might 
be akin to the “March Madness” NCAA Division I Basketball Champi-
onship for men’s college basketball. It would pose certain advantages 
and certain disadvantages. 
 The potential for enhanced profits, particularly from enlarged tel-
evision broadcasting revenue, suggests one leading rationale for BCS 
schools to adopt a playoff system. Compare the primary television con-
tract of postseason college basketball with that of BCS-sponsored post-
season college football. In 2000, CBS reached an eleven-year agreement 
with the NCAA to carry the men’s NCAA Basketball Tournament for $6 
billion.159 In 2008, ESPN acquired the BCS Championship series from 
2011 to 2014 for $495 million—about $380.5 million less per year than 
the basketball tournament.160 Even when taking into consideration dif-
ferences in contract length and the presence of a greater number of 
postseason basketball games than postseason football games, there re-
mains a notable disparity in television revenue between the two prime 
sporting events. Whereas the former constitutes a beloved and billion-
dollar playoff system, the latter resembles a smaller and disputatious 
sequence of ranking-inspired games. 
                                                                                                                      
159 See Sarah M. Konsky, Comment, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer Rules, 70 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1581, 1584 (2003). 
160 See Tracee Hamilton, An Idea That Is Pure Madness, Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 2010, at D1. 
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 A college football playoff system might also increase merchandise 
sales. Instead of a consumption framework in which fans purchase team 
merchandise for one bowl game, a playoff format would furnish oppor-
tunities for waves of sales, at least for those teams that progress in a 
playoff system. Indeed, each playoff level could be associated with new 
merchandise sales, such as is found in the NFL, with different styles of t-
shirts, caps, and other team items sold for the Wild Card Round, Divi-
sional Round, Conference Round, and the Super Bowl.161 
 Aside from opportunities for improved revenue, broader notions 
of legitimacy may also motivate a shift to a playoff system. Myriad critics 
of the BCS posit that a playoff system would produce a more “legiti-
mate” champion.162 Legitimacy, more generally, is associated with im-
proved business functioning and success in the marketplace.163 For fi-
nancial reasons, therefore, BCS schools may covet a system of games 
perceived as more rightful. 
 Playoffs might also appeal to BCS schools because they comport 
with the American narrative of the underdog who, no matter the odds, 
always possesses a chance to succeed through hard work and talent. In-
deed, one of the more prominent ideologies in the United States is the 
“meritocratic ideology,” defined by social psychologists John Jost and 
Orsolya Hunyady as belief in a system that “rewards individual ability 
and motivation, so success is an indicator of personal deservingness.”164 
This ideology leads Americans to view “the underdog” story in any con-
text as particularly appealing—and marketable.165 With the BCS and its 
system of ranking and automatic bids, the underdog—definable as a 
team from a non-BCS-sponsored conference—essentially has no chance 
at a national title or appearing in a bowl game.166 
                                                                                                                      
161 See Jamie Herzlich, Jets Sale Ahead: AFC East Champs’ Items Outperform Wild-Card Gi-
ants, Newsday (Long Island, N.Y.), Jan. 4, 2003, at A05 (discussing various levels of sales 
for NFL playoff games). 
162 See, e.g., Dan K. Thomasson, The BCS: Bunch of College Sellouts; Greed and Venality Have 
Come to Characterize the College Football Post-Season, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Jan. 6, 2010, 
at B7. 
163 See Royston Greenwood & David Deephouse, Legitimacy Seen as Key: Firms Ignore This 
Strategy at Own Peril, Globe & Mail (Toronto), Dec. 26, 2001, at B7. 
164 See John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, Antecedents and Consequences of System-Justifying 
Ideologies, 14 Current Directions in Psychol. Sci. 260, 261 (2005). 
165 See Michael McCann, Jack Bauer and Growing Up Rich, Situationist, Jan. 28, 2007, 
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“Horatio Alger” story is viewed by many as a myth. See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Mat-
thew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 993, 1010–12 (2004). 
166 See Hubert Mizell, Good, But Could Be Better, St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 5, 2000, at 1X. 
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 The meritocratic ideology appears to contribute to the more con-
siderable fan interest in the NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship 
than in the BCS National Championship Game. To illustrate, while the 
first seed Duke University and fifth seed Butler University NCAA Bas-
ketball Championship game in March 2010 attracted 48.1 million view-
ers, the BCS first-ranked University of Alabama and second-ranked Uni-
versity of Texas BCS Championship Game in January 2010 generated 
30.8 million viewers—a 14.9% increase from the previous year, but still 
considerably less than the number of viewers of the NCAA Men’s Bas-
ketball Championship.167 It should be noted, moreover, that basketball 
is not necessarily an intrinsically more popular sport than football in 
the United States. Indeed, the most recent Super Bowl attracted 106.5 
million U.S. viewers.168 
 There are, however, disadvantages to adopting a playoff system. A 
leading disadvantage would concern contract law and the contractual 
obligations inherent in broadcasting agreements between BCS member 
institutions and various networks and entertainment providers. ESPN, 
for instance, has a contract to broadcast the BCS Championship Series 
Games through 2014.169 If BCS schools sought a change of format prior 
to the expiration of the contract, it would either require a renegotia-
tion with ESPN or a contractual breach, the latter of which might risk a 
lawsuit with ESPN. 
 Although waiting for the expiration of existing contracts to adopt a 
playoff system would remove the possibility of breach of contract claims, 
it would not eliminate other types of obstacles. Determination of playoff 
eligibility would constitute one such concern. The resolution of that de-
termination, furthermore, would only beget other issues, such as 
whether to preserve school rivalry games and whether to preserve the 
importance of strength of schedule in determining which teams are in-
vited to participate in postseason football. 
 The value of regular-season games and their appeal to fans might 
also be damaged by shifting to a playoff format; once a school is as-
sured of a playoff spot, it may adopt a less competitive and aggressive 
approach in the remainder of its games. 
 Team redistribution would pose still another hurdle to a playoff 
system. The emergence of such a system would likely cause a reshuf-
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fling of teams and conferences. Teams in the Southeastern Conference 
(SEC), for instance, reveal why. Consider that ten of twelve teams in the 
SEC received bowl bids in 2010. If a playoff system were in a place, per-
haps only one of those twelve teams would be able to earn an invitation. 
As a result, several, if not most, SEC teams might attempt to flee the 
conference. Historic rivalries could therefore be eliminated, which in 
turn would trigger backlash from fans. None of this is to say that a play-
off system could not be created without sacrificing rivalries. Perhaps 
such a goal could be accomplished by inserting certain non-conference 
games into the schedule—but it would necessitate an arduous task. 
 It should be emphasized that whether a playoff change occurs 
would be influenced by which schools receive the spoils of the BCS sys-
tem. Under the current system, six conferences have received at least 
$100 million and Notre Dame received $23 million from the BCS since 
2004.170 Under a playoff system, these monies may be increased in the 
aggregate but also may be redistributed to a wider scope of colleges and 
universities. This highlights the difficulty of BCS reform: the schools in 
BCS conferences risk a new economic system that may prove more 
prosperous for all FBS teams, but not necessarily for BCS teams. 
 A less dramatic, though still significant BCS reform, would be to 
ensure that all twelve conferences are treated the same for purposes of 
participating in BCS-sponsored bowl games. This assurance could be 
obtained simply by expanding the number of BCS-sponsored bowl 
games. Doing so would mitigate any antitrust injury caused by the cur-
rent BCS system, as all conferences would be able to participate in BCS-
sponsored bowl games. Indeed, by including all twelve FBS conferences 
in the selection of bowl games and thereby assuring that every confer-
ence appears in a BCS-sponsored bowl game, antitrust worries would 
recede. To be sure, some bowl games would prove of higher financial 
and media value than others, meaning economic and reputational dis-
parities between bowl games would remain. Still, in this more egalitar-
ian arrangement, less prominent conferences such as the Mid-
American Conference and the Sun Belt Conference would obtain im-
proved media exposure and, in time, would likely be viewed as “equals” 
to the six conferences currently affiliated with the BCS. 
 A hybrid of the BCS and a playoff system would constitute still an-
other voluntary reform. A hybrid could preserve the BCS while poten-
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tially offering key benefits commonly associated with a playoff format, 
including increased viewership and spiked merchandizing revenue. 
 A possible first step in a hybrid model would entail the shortening 
of the regular season by one or two games. Although some colleges and 
universities would likely object to such a move because of concerns over 
lost revenue, a regular-season reduction would ensure that playoff 
games do not elongate the calendar of college football. Preserving the 
existing length of the college football season would sidestep concerns 
about both student-athletes missing additional classes and the increased 
risk of injury and bodily wear-and-tear that go along with the playing of 
additional football games. 
 The structuring of the playoff format would comprise the next step 
in a hybrid model. A sensible approach might include the first place 
team of each conference being automatically invited to the playoffs. 
Such a design would ensure that the team that dominates its conference 
rightly ascends to the collegiate playoffs. As it stands now, a team that 
dominates its conference may miss out on the top bowl games because it 
plays in a non-BCS sponsored conference. Also, by redistributing the top 
conference teams to play against one another, advancement would re-
quire defeating top teams from other conferences. To illustrate, a 
Mountain West Conference team, such as Texas Christian University, 
could play a team from the SEC, such as Auburn University. 
 Next, eight wild card teams could enter the playoffs based on 
strength of schedule and record. An arrangement of this sort would 
discourage a conference with important historic rivalries, such as the 
SEC, from voluntarily dissolving because their teams tend to be among 
the best. A BCS-style calculation, moreover, could be incorporated to 
assess which teams should qualify for a wild card. Like the current BCS 
ranking methodology, a playoff methodology could place statistical val-
ue in strength of opponents. Therefore, a competitive conference like 
the SEC might receive multiple wild-card selections. At the same time, 
the calculation should not factor in the historic prestige of a particular 
team or its conference; past strength of the current year opponents 
would frustrate a renewed emphasis on merit. 
 A blended approach is similar to how “bubble teams” make the 
NCAA tournament for men’s basketball. Although the teams with the 
best records in conferences normally earn positions in the tournament, 
those on the bubble are scrutinized based on the strength of schedule. 
Such a system has proven widely popular. 
 Although none of these potential changes to the BCS may emerge, 
they are likely more appealing “fixes” to the current controversial, but 
probably legal, system of postseason college football. And a fix to the 
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collegiate postseason is what fans and members of Congress are clamor-
ing for. 
Conclusion 
While the BCS is unpopular and exhibits a bevy of anticompetitive 
qualities, this Article asserts that it is likely compatible with sections 1 of 
2 of the Sherman Act. This conclusion is reached primarily because the 
deferential rule of reason analysis would be applied in a legal challenge 
to the BCS and because the BCS offers procompetitive characteristics 
that may not be obtainable through other arrangements and that were 
not shown in the fifty-six years prior to the BCS coming into existence. 
The BCS could nonetheless benefit from voluntary, economically max-
imizing improvements that would redesign postseason college football 
to better comport with social, political and commercial expectations. 
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